The Effects of the Russian Energy Sector on the Security of the Baltic States
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What do $80 oil barrels, single hull tankers and nuclear energy reactors have in
common? They all have the potential to affect the security of countries. A
region’s security can be influenced by the energy sectors of other countries
especially in the areas of the environment and economy.
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Volume 8, 2006
66
The Effects of the Russian Energy Sector
on the Security of the Baltic States
By Liina Mauring and Daniel Schaer
∗
Introduction
What do $80 oil barrels, single hull tankers and nuclear energy reactors have in
common? They all have the potential to affect the security of countries. A
region’s security can be influenced by the energy sectors of other countries
especially in the areas of the environment and economy.
The European Commission forecasts an energy dependence level of 70% in
2030 for the European Union compared with 50% today
1
. It is also generally
agreed that the world’s energy demand and consumption will continue its
growth for decades. Furthermore 40% of EU gas imports originate from Russia
and by 2030 over 60% of EU gas imports are expected to come from Russia
with overall EU dependence on gas imports expected to reach 80%
2
. Therefore,
European dependence on the Russian energy sector does not only weaken the
security of the Baltic States, but also that of the European Union (EU) itself.
Without a significant domestic energy supply, the EU needs to guarantee the
security of its external energy supply sources. This, however, must be done
without negatively affecting the security of other EU member states.
The European Commission’s “Report on the Green Paper on Energy - Four
years of European initiatives” confirms that the EU’s dependence on energy
imports is growing daily. The report also confirms the worries of the 2000
Green Paper, where security of supply, the spread of nuclear energy, the threat
of terrorist attacks, the need to diversify energy sources and environmental
safety are considered as threats to European security
3
.
On the basis of these developments, energy has become a key topic in EU-
Russia relations. Energy co-operation was at the top of the agenda of the EU-
Russia Summit held on October 4. In 2005 in London the first meeting of the
Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) on Energy was held the day before in the
same venue. The PPC reported to the Summit that energy is a crucial part of the
relationship between Russia and the EU, and that they had discussed ways of
∗
Liina Mauring works in the European Parliament. Daniel Schaer is a diplomat in the Estonian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This article reflects only the thoughts of the authors, and not
necessarily those of any of these institutions.
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deepening their engagement. The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue’s 6
th
Progress
report was released on 7 October 2005. It recognised the need for increasing co-
operation and the exchange of information in the energy sector, and underlined
the importance of the convergence of regulatory frameworks in the EU and
Russia
4
. Several green papers, white papers and reports on the energy sector,
have also reflected the importance of this topic on the EU agenda.
This article argues that the EU’s dependence on the Russian energy sector not
only affects the Baltic States economically, but also has a significant impact on
security in the Baltic States. This article concentrates on energy, environmental
and economic security and so from the perspective of soft security. The first
section introduces the EU’s dependence on the Russian energy sector through
EU-Russia relations, while looking at how this affects the stability of energy
supply in Europe. The second section looks at the Russian energy sector and its
environmental security, while presenting clear examples of threats to Baltic
security. The third section presents the internal energy security situation in the
Baltic States. The fourth section is a case study of the planned German-Russian
gas pipeline that is to be built in the Baltic Sea.
1. EU-Russia relations and the dependence on the Russian energy
Since the customary security threats of military nature are not an issue in EU-
Russia relations any more, the development of Russia's increasing interest in the
EU common market poses new threats of other origin - namely those of a “soft
security” nature. There is reason to believe that the EU’s dependence on Russian
energy has created several threats to soft security, defined as non-military
security that has a cross-border effect on its neighbours and presents a threat
that is hard to defend independently.
The EU’s energy dependence has allowed Russia to create a new policy tool for
itself - energy. The new approach of using economic levers as a diplomatic tool
is letting the EU know that the relationship is ruled by "interests" (national,
economic etc.). There is, however, uncertainty in the relationship as to whether
the Russia-Germany natural gas pipeline construction and similar projects
should fall under Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or whether they
should remain bilateral agreements. There is also the question as to what role the
Commission should play in this domain as energy falls into the 1
st
pillar - the
community pillar. The article treats the energy security question as a CFSP
question as it is an aspect EU security in this context. If Europe is seeking the
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deepening of European integration then these kinds of issues should at least
partly be treated at the EU level.
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia
serves as a basis for their bilateral relations, which came into force as of 1
December 1997
5
. Formally, Russia is the EU's strategic partner. Current debate
shows that the EU and Russia share common interests that are largely related to
the energy sector as the EU is the largest importer of Russian energy and
therefore the largest market for Russia in that sector (EU's trade deficit with
Russia originates from the energy sector, Russia accounts for some 50% of total
gas imports or 25% of total EU gas consumption, and for over 30% of total
crude oil and oil product imports or over 25% of total EU oil consumption
6
).
1.1 Economic security
A fairly new concept in the security debate that has developed considerably since
the end of the Cold War is economic security. Barry Buzan defines economic
security, “Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and
markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power”
7
. This
article concentrates on the supply of resources aspect of economic security and
the reliance on Russian energy.
After looking at the statistics and reading the reports compiled by European
institutions (Commission Energy Green Paper) it can be said that the EU is
dependent on Russian energy and that in turn leads to potential threat of energy
price discrimination, which in turn is related to the concept of energy supply
security. What happens if Russia decides to use its energy exports as foreign
policy tools?
8
This problem is listed in the “National Security Concept for
Estonia”, “A major threat factor is the great dependence of Estonia’s gas and
electrical systems upon foreign monopolistic energy systems and suppliers”
9
.
The Lithuanian security concept has a similar point and the Latvian concept
mentions economic security in general. However, this might even be the most
dangerous threat to the Baltic States and the European Union in particular
because European economies and cities are dependent on energy. The lifestyle
of every European would be significantly affected by a decline in energy supply.
The EU must maintain a stable energy supply, but the question remains whether
Russia is a reliable partner? It would be rather difficult to change strategic energy
suppliers in a short run. Can only one dominant energy supplier guarantee stable
supply? The volatility of energy price may also depend on other factors such as
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Russia's internal political stability, e.g. in case of a macroeconomic shock the
state's budget may have to be increasingly financed by revenues from energy
sector exports. Currently, the Russian fiscal dependence on gas and oil revenues
amounts to almost 37% of annual budget revenues making the budget
significantly dependent on revenues from their energy sector
10
. Therefore, the
price of imported energy from Russia is not only dependent on EU-Russia
relations, but also on the internal developments in Russia, which the EU has
very limited control over.
The growing dependence on Russian energy fortunately has another side as well.
The fact that the Russian energy sector is a part of the world's energy sector
makes it dependent on the prices of world energy, which reduces its arbitrary
possibilities for gas price manipulation. So, it can be said that there is a degree of
mutual dependence as the growing European dependence on energy imports
from Russia are being balanced by Russia’s reliance on oil and gas revenues
11
. In
other words the invisible hand does its job.
When looking at potential energy trade partners, we cannot forget the interests
of China, Japan and India towards Russian energy. These economies are also
dependent on energy imports and could play a role in disrupting the EU-Russia
relationship, as Russia will not be able to supply all of the demand. This
represents the growing dependence of other consumer regions on imported
energy where the competition is predicted to intensify, which will in turn modify
international political and economic relations
12
.
The world’s demand for energy will also force the EU to make concessions in
negotiating with Russia in other policy areas. If Russia is able to freely choose
whom it will supply, the choice will be made based on two criteria: the highest
price and the least political demands. This gives a significant advantage to China
who is prepared to buy energy at all costs to ensure their continued economic
growth.
Another problem with supply is the concentration of world gas and oil reserves
in a few areas (including Russia). This limits the amount of potential suppliers
and gives these countries "monopolistic" control over energy sources and may
mean monopolistic prices
13
. The EU will try to balance its supply by looking at
other energy import sources such as the Baku-Tbilissi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
supplying energy from the Caspian region
14
. However, a threat to this
diversification of energy supply sources is the role played by Russia in the CIS
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RUSSIAN ENERGY SECTOR AND BALTIC SECURITY
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area. Recently, a Russian state-owned Pipeline Company Transneft has decided
to remove its signature from an agreement to provide oil transport solutions to
the Kazakhstan energy company Kazmunaigaz to block oil transport from
Kazakhstan to Latvia
15
. This is an obvious attempt by Russia to use its energy
transport monopoly to control supply in the energy market.
1.2 The Russian energy sector and its environmental security
World’s demand for energy has helped the energy industry grow significantly.
Oil, natural gas, electricity, coal and nuclear energy, the main energy sources can
be found in Russia and are all exported by Russia to world markets. Since energy
has become a key component of economies around the world, its importance in
a security context has grown. The production, export and consumption of
energy can threaten security in several ways through environmental damage,
attacks against energy networks and supply related effects on economies.
Russia’s most important energy source according to exports is crude oil of which
70% is exported. The Oil and Gas Journal lists Russia’s proven oil reserves to be
at 60 million barrels, ranking it 8
th
in the world. Russia also ranks second in the
world to Saudi Arabia in oil production and exports. 60% of Russia’s oil exports
are transported via pipelines
16
. Another important energy source in Russia is
natural gas. Russia’s proven natural gas reserves more than double those of its
closest rival as it places number one in the world with 1 680 trillion cubic feet
(Tcf) of gas reserves. It was also the world’s largest producer (22.4 Tcf) and
exporter (7.1 Tcf) of natural gas in 2004. Russia has a significant pipeline system
to distribute the natural gas domestically and internationally.
One of the most multifaceted Russian energy sources is electricity. Electricity is
produced using three different methods: thermal, hydro and nuclear. Russia has
440 thermal and hydro electricity plants of which 77 produce electricity by
burning coal. Russia also has 31 nuclear reactors in 10 nuclear plants and plans
on building 4 or 5 more nuclear power plants in the next 15 years
17
. Thermal
power accounts for 63%, hydro power 21% and nuclear power 16% of total
energy production. Russia exported an estimated 55 billion kilowatt hours of
energy to former Soviet countries, China, Poland, Turkey and Finland in 2004.
Another major source of Russian energy is coal. Russia has the world’s second
largest recoverable coal reserves (173 billion short tons), second to the United
States.
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1.2.1 Environmental security
Environmental security is an aspect of security that is often forgotten. Several
security theories do not even take environmental security into consideration.
Environmental security is needed to address threats to the ecological balance of
states with an emphasis placed on the safety of the basic requirements of human
life: the quality of water and air, the purity of arable land. According to Buzan,
“Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the
planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human
enterprises depend”
18
.
The environment is also a relevant topic in the Baltic soft security especially
because of the Soviet heritage. One of the weaknesses of environmental security
is that it often needs to be politicised or needs a public outcry before it is dealt
with. Many environmental security actions seem to be reactive rather than
preventive measures. This is the reason why environmental security breaks down
into two categories: scientific, based on hard scientific facts; and political,
influenced by the decision makers and public interest
19
.
An environmental catastrophe in Russia would also affect the human security in
the Baltic States. The result of the pollution of water or the threat of radiation
could lead to a significant movement in refugees towards the EU.
1.2.2 Nuclear energy
Nuclear safety is the most talked about potential environmental threat of the
Russian energy sector. Environmentalists including Russian environmentalists
say that none of Russia’s nuclear reactors meet Western standards. The
Leningrad nuclear power plant (LNPP) located in Sosnovy Bor, 80 kilometres
west of St. Petersburg produces 50% of the electricity in the St. Petersburg
region and 25% of its production is exported to Finland. The 4 reactors are
RBMK-1000 model a new generation of the models in Chernobyl “…thought to
be the most unsafe in the world…”
20
The LNPP is one of the largest and oldest
plants in Russia. Construction on the first reactor began in 1967 and the reactor
was fully operational in 1973. This style of reactor has a life span of 30 years.
Thus, the two oldest reactors were supposed to have been taken out of
operation in 2003 and 2005, but a decision was taken in 1999 to extend their use
after reconstruction
21
.
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Bellona, a Norwegian NGO, believes that the LNPP is a safety risk to the
environmental security of the Baltic area. It currently poses a threat to the Baltic
Sea as one of its larger fuel element storage buildings lies 90 meters from the
Gulf of Finland and is in an appalling state with large cracks in the walls and
roof
22
. The “Asset Mission” by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
to the LNPP in May 1993 reviewed 327 operational events that had occurred
from January 1982 to April 1993 of which 152 were determined safety relevant.
The mission also found 5 safety problems that affect the general safety of the
power plant
23
. However, it must be noted that an operational event occurs in a
nuclear plant in the world almost everyday.
1.2.3 Nuclear pollution
Radioactive contamination, having its beginnings in the Soviet period, is still a
major source of nuclear pollution. The Yablokov report, an official Russian
report compiled in 1993, stated that from 1964 until 1990 at least 17 000 barrels
of solid radioactive waste, thirteen nuclear reactors from submarines, between
11 000 and 17 000 containers of radioactive waste were sunk in the Novaya
Zemlya and Kara Sea areas. Some cases were already leaking and others had
holes shot into them to speed up the sinking
24
. Another legacy of the nuclear
pollution is “Lake Karachay … one of the most polluted spots on earth”
25
.
Experts say that the lake contains seven times more strontium-90 and cesium-
137 than was released in the Chernobyl explosion. Other significant problems
with nuclear safety include the storage, transportation and processing of nuclear
waste, insufficient safety rules, brain drain, employee strikes, lack of financing
and terrorism.
1.2.4 Crude oil
Being the world’s second largest crude oil exporter and producer also increases
the potential for environmental desecration. The total length of Russia’s
mainline pipelines is equal to 240 000 km
26
. Transneft, Russia’s largest oil
pipeline company says “Special attention is paid by OAO AK Transneft to
providing highest environmental safety of the Baltic Pipeline System’s facilities
at all stages of the project implementation”
27
. Environmentalists refute this by
claiming that environmental legislation was not met; “We did not find any
waterproofing on the pipe, nor, which is more important, on the welds. So the
pipe corrosion has started even before coming into use”
28
.
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The most serious problems with oil pipelines are found in Chechnya. Estimates
have been made that 30 million barrels of crude have leaked into the ground
from the area’s black market oil industry of over 15 000 illegal mini refineries
29
.
Of course these mini refineries have no interest whatsoever in the environment
and do not follow environmental safety legislation. Greenpeace has estimated
that 5% of all crude oil extracted in Russia leaks from its pipelines every year
representing over 15 million tonnes per year
30
.
Only 4 million bbl/d of Russia’s yearly 7 million bbl/d production of liquids for
export are transported in its pipeline system
31
. This means that a significant
amount of production has to use alternative transport sources: rail and oil
tanker. This has several effects on the environmental security of the Baltic
States: the proliferation of single hull oil tankers in the Baltic Sea as Russia is the
only member of the Council of the Baltic Sea States that does not support the
banning of single hull tankers; the construction of new Russian oil ports on the
Baltic Sea; increased travel of oil transport trains and trucks. All of these cases
increase the risk of an environmental catastrophe
32
.
1.2.5 Environmental terrorism
Terrorism is also a threat to the soft security of the Baltic States. Russia’s large
and intricate pipeline system and its nuclear energy plants are potential soft
targets for terrorist attacks. Islamist terror groups in the former Soviet States
including Chechen separatists pose a threat to security
33
. By attacking either a
pipeline or a nuclear plant serious damage can be done not only to the energy
supply, but also to the environment. Placing a bomb at one or more strategic
pipeline locations would result in significant oil spills, which would have the
potential of polluting water sources. With the energy pipeline network running
right to the Baltic Sea ports of Ventspils, Butinge, Tallinn, Primorsk and
Gdansk, the entire Baltic area is at threat. The three ports of Ventspils, Butinge
and Primorsk transited 1.1 million barrels of crude oil per day in 2004 with the
oil arriving through pipelines.
A more serious threat is an attack on one of the nuclear reactors. The potential
environmental and human security repercussions would be immeasurable. An
attack could bring a new nuclear disaster worse than Chernobyl. It is estimated
that only 3.8 to 20 per cent of the reactor fuel was released in the Chernobyl
accident. The accident still seriously contaminated over 125 000 km
2
of the
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, the home of over 7 million people. Radiation
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reached most of Scandinavia, Poland and the Baltic States, as well as southern
Germany, Switzerland, northern France and England
34
. Belarus estimates the
damages of the disaster to be valued at 235 billion USD. Since this is only the
beginning of the list of damages, it makes one think what could the damage be if
all the reactor fuel of a nuclear power plant is released.
35
International organisations and other countries such as the United States and the
EU carry out significant co-operation projects with Russia including the funding
of energy safety projects. The European Commission lists the achievement of a
high level of nuclear safety in Russia as one of its co-operation objectives in its
“Country strategy paper-Russia 2002-2006”. Around 300 million EUR have
been earmarked to nuclear safety projects in Russia through the TACIS
36
programme from 1991-2001, showing the EU’s great concern for nuclear safety
in Russia
37
.
1.3 The energy situation in the Baltic States
The Baltic States are not only a consumer of Russian energy, but they also play a
significant role in the distribution of Russian energy. The oil exports of the three
major Baltic ports of Ventspils, Butinge and Tallinn represented approximately
16% of net Russian crude oil exports
38
. Being an important transit location for
the Russian export system has given the Baltic States flexibility in bilateral
relations with Russia. To reduce dependence on the use of the Baltic ports as
transport solutions, Russia has built a port in Primorsk, which significantly
reduced the crude oil exports of Ventspils and Butinge. The transit fees collected
by the Baltic States represent a fairly significant part of GDP (4-5% and up to
10% when transport services are included)
39
.
Russia’s natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, whose majority stake belongs to the
Russian Federation, is the only player in the Baltic natural gas market. Currently,
the Baltic States, because of their special transit country status, enjoy a price for
natural gas of around $80-$85 per thousand cubic meters as opposed to the
European prices (around $120-135 per thousand cubic meters)
40
. Gazprom
plans to raise the price of natural gas for the Baltic States by 50% at the
beginning of next year and this will be simplified by eliminating the Baltic States
as transit locations
41
. Gazprom has also begun to make significant investments
in natural gas utilities in the Baltic region (34% stake in Latvia's Latvijas Gaze
and a 37% stake in Estonia's Eesti Gaas). These investments have two purposes:
the first being the control over essential infrastructure and the second being the
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reduction of transit fees and other costs when the Baltic companies are owned
by the exporting companies.
The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) in Lithuania is another relic of Soviet
occupation, but its importance to Lithuania’s energy supply is significant as 85%
of Lithuania’s electricity production comes from the power plant
42
. The INPP
consisted of three RBMK-1500 models; reactor 3 was never operational, reactor
1 was decommissioned on 31 December 2004 and reactor 2 will be
decommissioned in 2009. Lithuania and Estonia are both net electricity
exporters and Latvia is a net importer from the other Baltic States and Russia.
Currently, Estonia, Latvia and Finland are co-operating in joint electricity
project, Estlink, which aims to lessen the dependence on Russian energy by
linking the Baltic States to the Nordic countries through an underwater cable
running between Estonia and Helsinki.
1.4 The German-Russian Natural Gas Pipeline-A Case Study
The German-Russian natural gas pipeline, the Putin-Schröder Pact, according to
Lithuanian MEP Vytautas Landsbergis
43
, is planned to run 1 200 kilometres
from Vyborg, Russia to Greifswald, Germany as early as 2010
44
. The most
publicized concerns regarding the pipeline construction under the most polluted
sea in Europe, the Baltic Sea, are of environmental nature. Lithuanian Prime
Minister Algirdas Brazauskas has warned that the project was dangerous as it
risked disturbing tonnes of chemical weapons sunk in the Baltic Sea by the
Russians following the World War II
45
. The dangers related to the building of
the pipeline become more serious as they are largely unpredictable. Estonian
environmental specialists Marek Strandberg has said that building this
tremendous pipeline in the bottom of the Baltic Sea is a threat to the sea's
ecosystem as the construction is planned over a short period of time. That
would result in sediment rising up from the bottom of the sea and will cause the
rise of nutrients in the seawater thus reducing water transparency, the effects of
which are multiplied by the shallowness of the Baltic Sea. Strandberg emphasises
that we still do not know the details of the upcoming project, which makes any
assessments of the effects on the sea's ecosystem unpredictable - a thorough
environmental risk assessment is missing in this project
46
.
Although the environmental aspect of the pipeline project is of great
importance, the political aspect is what creates the most controversy. The
environmental aspect is important, since it is the only way to prevent the
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pipeline from being built, but even with ecologically sound arguments that will
be difficult. In many cases, the environmental aspect is a cover up for the EU’s
internal problems. The pipeline agreement was put together in secrecy, in which
the Baltic States and Poland were not able to participate in the negotiations.
Germany states that it is their sovereign right to ensure their energy security.
This imposes on the concept of unity among the EU member states. It is
customary to consult with your partners in matters that might affect them.
Another area of debate involves the costs of the construction of the pipeline and
whether it would be cheaper to build it above the ground. Most statistics show
that it would be cheaper to build the pipeline above the ground as construction
and maintenance costs would be significantly lower. However, the advantage of
constructing the pipeline in the Baltic Sea from the Russian point of view is that
Russia does not need to negotiate transit fees with nearly half a dozen countries,
but at the same time it has an effect on these countries as well
47
. Namely, the
Russian new energy distribution policy aims at leaving the former Soviet
republics in isolation from direct energy distribution channels. Therefore there is
potential to isolate the Baltic States from a very important part of EU - Russia
relations.
According to the planned agenda Germany will be the major retailer of Russian
gas in Western Europe. It will also increase the dependence of the Baltic States
and the EU on Russian gas as the Russian energy giant Gazprom will own 51%
of the pipeline. Recently, Russia announced that it is happy to look at having
new partners join the project, but it is not willing to give up any part of its
majority ownership
48
.
Estonian Member of European Parliament, Vice-President of the Parliament’s
Foreign Affairs Committee Toomas Hendrik Ilves has an interesting
interpretation of the actions of the Russian Federation. He shares the belief with
other Russia experts that Russia is interested only in control. “[But] why bother
occupy them (the Baltic States)? It's so much easier and less troublesome to
simply control them. No messy independence fights, occupation troops, etc.
You get the same effect if you simply control the government, access and
influence important international organizations such as NATO and the EU”
states Ilves. Russia is trying to achieve this by buying up components of vital
infrastructure, and not only in the energy sector
49
.
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Conclusion
The situation is frightening - dependence on imported energy in the EU will rise
from the current level of 50% to 70% in 2030. Even worse, 90% of the EU oil
demand will have to be satisfied by imports by 2030. More frightening is the fact
that the energy that the EU imports creates serious threats to the security of the
Baltic States and ultimately of the EU. Environmental dumping, the ending of
environmentally unsafe energy production methods in the home country (e.g.
nuclear energy) while buying non-green and environmentally unsafe energy from
secondary sources (Russia) is an everyday occurrence in the EU.
The Russian energy sector affects the Baltic States in two ways: first in creating a
series of soft security threats resulting from shabby energy safety, an old and
tired energy infrastructure, lack of finances and a hunger for growth in imports
at any cost; second a blind reliance on Russian energy by the EU.
There appear to be two differing views on what should be done to solve the soft
security problems. The first is to use more of a “soft” method by engaging in
international co-operation and funding energy security programmes such as the
EU is currently doing. The idea is that by treating Russia as an equal partner and
only reacting when asked will solve the problem. The second more radical view
is that there has been an overemphasis on international mechanisms and the
stress should be placed on the changing of internal policies and internal
conditions of the threatening states
50
. This solution is also difficult as in the
context of Common Foreign and Security Policy it is almost impossible for the
EU to have one common policy on relations with Russia as the EU is incapable
to define its common interests especially in the field of energy supply. The worry
is that, “…when it comes to Russia, individual member states’ interests will
triumph over the interests of the Union if a good bilateral deal can be had”
51
.
A prime example of the ineffectiveness of the EU policy is that there is no
consensus as to whether the Russian-German Pipeline project should fall in the
framework of CFSP or should it be based on bilateral agreements. So far, the
only countries that currently worry about the non-coherent policy on energy
supply security issues are the Baltic States and Poland who have a long history of
relations with Russia and therefore are quite cautious about the relations. These
four countries along with Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary find that
“…the EU hitherto has pursued a needlessly naïve appeasement policy toward
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78
Russia, based on lack of knowledge or the pursuit of narrow national agendas
rather than based on the interests of the Union as a whole”
52
.
The second problem is connected to the increasing dependence on Russian
energy supplies. If the energy market is able to operate solely on market forces
there should be no reason for worry. However, Russia itself is dependent on the
revenues from its energy sector, which places stable energy supply from Russia
into question.
A solution for the energy dependence as well as the diminishing oil and gas
reserves, and rising oil prices lies in using renewable, environmentally friendly
sources of energy. It has been predicted that oil will cease to be produced in
approximately 80 years, meaning that the problem needs to be solved urgently
53
.
Europe is already taking a lead in promoting new energy sources, but it still
needs to do more. It needs to find a common position on energy security that
encompasses all aspects of the sector not simply concentrating on reducing
energy consumption, finding new energy sources and diversifying supply. The
EU must take into consideration the security threats of the Russian energy
sector and must work together to negate them as soon as possible.
NOTES
1
European Commission (EC), “Report on the Green Paper on Energy - Four years of European
initiatives”, June 2005,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/
http://www.euractiv.com/
EC “Report on the Green Paper on Energy” pp.1-15.
4
European Commission Press Release, “EU-Russia Energy Dialogue’s 6
th
Progress report”,
07.10.05.
5
http://europa.eu.int/comm/
European Commission Press Release, “EU-Russia Energy Dialogue’s 6
th
Progress report”,
07.10.05.
7
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A new framework for analysis, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder/London, 1998, pp. 7-8.
8
Reuters “Russia must diversify energy export routes” 22.11.05.
9
National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia
http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_177/
http://www.theglobalist.com/
http://www.iea.org/textbase/
Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics (TREN/C1-06-2002),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/
Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics (TREN/C1-06-2002)
http://europa.eu.int/comm/
Andrew Beatty “Middle East remains one step ahead”, European Voice, 20-26.10.05.
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Baltic Security & Defence Review
Volume 8, 2006
79
15
BNS-Interfax, “Kasahstani ärritas Venemaa keeldumine naftaveost Leedu” 20.11.05.
16
If not detailed by a special endnote, the information in this article with regards to the energy
markets comes from http://www.eia.doe.gov/ Official Energy Statistics from the U.S.
Government.
17
Melissa Griggs, “Summary” of Nikita Lomagin Seminar “Soft Security Problems in Northwest
Russia”, Davis Centre for Russian Studies, Harvard University, 14.03.2002.
18
Buzan et al., pp. 7-8.
19
Buzan et al., pp. 71-72.
20
Fact Sheet “Leningrad Power Station”, http://www.bellona.no/imaker?
viewed 10.11.05
Pursiainen, p.108.
22
Fact Sheet “Leningrad Power Station”, please also see the pictures
http://www.bellona.no/e/
NEI Source Book (4
th
edition), http://www.insc.anl.gov/neisb/
Pursiainen, pp. 112-113.
25
Russian environmental issues, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
http://www.bellona.no/en/
Transneft homepage, http://www.transneft.ru/
Pursiainen, p. 117.
29
Russian environmental issues, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
Pursiainen, p.117.
31
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
Please see this article on oil pipeline bursts in Russia,
http://www.bellona.no/en/
Gal Luft and Anne Korin "Terror's next target" The Journal of International Security Affairs,
December 2003, http://www.iags.org/n0111041.
http://www.chernobyl.info/
09.11.05.
A scary example of the potential for a terrorist attack on a nuclear site was the capture of a
terrorist cell in Australia. Police arrested 18 men on November 8
th
2005 in connection to an anti-
terrorism operation. Police have claimed that “Islamic terrorists were planning to inflict
"maximum damage" with a devastating attack on Australia's only nuclear reactor”. The police also
found bomb-making equipment. The Lucas Heights nuclear plant consists of two nuclear that
were built in the 50s of which the smaller has been closed down. The security of the site has been
questioned as three of the men had been caught close to the nuclear plant in December 2004 and
in December 2001 more than 60 Greenpeace activists entered the facility to point out the security
failures.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2005/11/15/ixnewstop.html viewed on 16.11.05.
For more information on TACIS http://europa.eu.int/comm/
European Commission Country strategy paper-Russia 2002-2006 p. 5 and annex 4,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
http://www.arileht.ee/
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
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Volume 8, 2006
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41
Gazprom tõstab Balti riikidele gaasi hinda poole võrra,
http://www.postimees.ee/
European Commission, External Relations, Nuclear Safety in Central Europe & the New
Independent States,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/
Vytautas Landsbergis, Sitting of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.
44
http://www.eubusiness.com/
BERLIN, Oct 25 (AFP).
46
E-mail from Marek Strandberg, 30.11.05
47
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
Interfax-BNS, "Moskva ei vastusta investorite lisandumist Läänemerealuse gaasijuhtme
projekti", Moscow, 04.12.05.
49
Interview with Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Brussels, 30.11.05.
50
James Sherr, “Strengthening ‘Soft Security’: what is to be done”, Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, May 2003.
51
Toomas Hendrik Ilves, “The Pleiades Join the Stars: Transatlanticism and Eastern
Enlargement”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs (CRIA), Volume 18, Number 2, July
2005 p. 198.
52
Ilves. CRIA p. 197.
53
http://physics.ius.edu/kyle/E/
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